



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

the reviewer's opinion, is emphatically not the most important side. Hume is supposed to represent "Sympathetic Naturalism." As might be expected, the exposition of his system is hardly illuminating; and the summary condemnation of Hume involves the unconditional rejection of all forms of 'naturalism,' as will be seen from the following quotation. "Naturalistic methods tend either to degenerate into Exclusive Egoism, or to regard conscience as an unreasonable and inexplicable instinct. Hume's Ethics illustrates the first [sic] of these defects, and to some extent the second, since he can give no reason why some natural virtues are approved. . . . Moral obligation, as ordinarily understood, is therefore meaningless in Hume's system; we cannot be under an obligation to do anything except to follow the pleasure of the moment, and we *must* do that" (pp. 188, 189). Such passages are painfully reminiscent of some of the most unfortunate pages ever penned by Green, and show only too clearly that the author of this volume, in spite of his ability and evident sincerity, lacks the capacity for really understanding positions fundamentally different from his own.

Considering his attitude toward 'naturalism' in general, it was perhaps to be expected that Mr. Rogers would have little to say of Utilitarianism in its unadulterated form, which for him dates from Bentham. He devotes less than six pages of actual exposition to Bentham and J. S. Mill, representing "Egoistic Utilitarianism" and "Sympathetic Utilitarianism" respectively, while he gives more than seven pages of exposition to Sidgwick, as representing "Intuitionist Utilitarianism." The chapter on "Evolutional Naturalism" is almost wholly devoted to a rather conventional exposition and criticism of Spencer. The final chapter, "English Rational Idealism," gives a very brief account of T. H. Green's ethical theory, which, however, is fairly intelligible in the light of the previous treatment of the ethical philosophy of Kant and Hegel in the two chapters following that on Hume.

ERNEST ALBEE.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Essays in Radical Empiricism. By WILLIAM JAMES. (Edited by R. B. PERRY.) Longmans, Green, & Co., N. Y., 1912.—pp. xiii, 283.

This volume of *Essays* represents, as the editor's preface states, "an attempt to carry out a plan which William James is known to have formed several years before his death." The twelve essays of which the book consists were originally published as separate articles by Professor James. In preparing this volume, the editor "has been governed by two motives. On the one hand he has sought to preserve and make accessible certain important articles not to be found in Professor James's other books. . . . On the other hand he has sought to bring together in one volume a set of essays treating systematically of one independent, coherent and fundamental doctrine" (p. v). The doctrine in question is that to which the author gave the name of radical empiricism, which, though intimately connected, was not by him identified with pragmatism. In order to carry out the plan as Professor James seems

originally to have had it in mind, and also to give a more complete and systematic presentation, three essays are included which were reprinted in Professor James's earlier books. These three are: *The Thing and its Relations*, *The Experience of Activity*, and *The Essence of Humanism*. While the essays included in the book are of the 'occasional' sort, they possess much more coherence and unity than one might antecedently expect. This is partly because the editor wisely disregarded the fact that some of them had already been reprinted and selected such as would serve best the purpose of giving an adequate exposition of radical empiricism. Some of Professor James's most notable articles bearing on the pragmatic controversy, such as, *Does Consciousness Exist?* and *A World of Pure Experience*, appear now for the first time within the covers of a book.

These essays, then, are intended to constitute, not a collection but a treatise. They "set forth systematically and within brief compass the doctrine of radical empiricism" (p. vi). The central doctrine of the book is the thesis that "the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves" (p. x). This proposition differentiates the position from historical empiricism, gives the clue to an empirical interpretation of activity and to the way of escape from dualism generally, and indicates how the pragmatic doctrine of truth may receive a concrete, empirically verifiable setting or application. When properly elaborated, radical empiricism excludes all reality of a transcendental or trans-empirical sort, and provides a new basis and incentive for morality and religion.

For the student of philosophy a glance at the table of contents suffices to assure him that this book traverses familiar ground. With the exception of the final chapter on *Absolutism and Empiricism*, which appeared in 1884 in *Mind*, all the twelve essays were published within the past eight years. Eight of the twelve essays are reprinted from the *Journal of Philosophy*, two from *Mind*, one from the *Psychological Review*, and one from the *Archives de Psychologie*.

It is perhaps superfluous to add that in making these writings more easily accessible the editor has performed a service to philosophy. This service is exceptionally valuable, however, on account of both the good judgment shown in the selection and arrangement of the essays and the excellent preface which introduces them to the reader. We may hope that the book will promote a better understanding of the philosophy of William James and contribute something towards the differentiation of his standpoint from the rest of the "pragmatic movement."

B. H. BODE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson. By HUGH S. R. ELLIOT, with a preface by SIR RAY LANKESTER. Longmans, Green and Co., London and New York, 1912.—pp. xix, 257.

The reader will not go far in this book without discovering that Professor